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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Thi£ is an appeal from a final judgment and decree
of divorce and from an order on plaintiff's motion to clarify
findings of fact and defendant's motion for court to
reevaluate assets.

Said decree and ord^r were made by the

Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde/ one of the Judges of the Second
Judicial District Court/ Weber County/ State of Utah.
Jurisdiction is based on Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules of the
Utah Court of Appeals and Title 78-2a-3^2)(g) , Utah Code
Annotated.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the District Court abased its discretion in
the valuation and distribution of marital assets by (1)
failing to establish the valuation of tHe marital residence
on the basis of an offer to purchase ma<$e by the appellant;
(2) failing to

take account of the early withdrawal penalty

and tax consequences of such withdrawal in valuing the
appellant's Kiraft thrift plan; and (3) failing to make
adequate findings of fact to support hi$ final order of
valuation and distribution.
Whether appellant's appeal is frivolous/ justifying
the award of attorney's fees to respondent.
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DETERMINATIVE RULES
See Rule 52(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/
Exhibit A of addendum.
See Rule 33/ Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals/
Exhibit B of addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal by defendant/ Robert Eugene
Ellison/ from a judgment and decree of divorce and from a
final order on cross motions for clarification by plaintiff
and for reevaluation of assets by defendant/ wherein
defendant claims that the Court committed error in the
valuation of two assets: the family home and the Kraft thrift
plan.
2.

Course of the Proceedings.

The case was tried before the Honorable Ronald 0.
Hyde/ one of the Judges of the Second Judicial District
Court, Weber County, Utah/ on February 23/ 24 and 25, 1987.
At the conclusion of the trial, the Judge ruled from the
bench regarding custody of three children, child support, and
visitation.

The final ruling on property distribution was

made pursuant to a memorandum decision dated March 2, 1987.
Findings of fact/ conclusions of law/ and judgment and decree
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of divorce were signed by the Court and filed on June 22,
1987/ following a hearing held on post-trial motions on
June 5, 1987.
3.

Disposition in the District Court.

Pursuant to plaintiff-respondent's motion to
clarify findings of fact and conclusion$ of law and decree of
divorce/ and defendant-appellant's motion for the court to
reevaluate assets,

Judge Hyde accepted £n substance the

findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of divorce
prepared by plaintiff-respondent's attorney/ and refused to
reevaluate the two assets requested by defendant-appellant.
4.

Statement of Material Facts.

Appellant's statement of the cpase does not set
forth fully or accurately the evidence which has a bearing on
the issues on appeal.

The parties were married to each other

on June 18, 1970 (T. 4 ) .

At the time ot

the divorce,

plaintiff-respondent (hereinafter referred to as Wife) was 42
and defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as Husband)
was 58 (T. 4 ) . Wife has a master's decree in special
education with additional training in counseling/ and at the
time of the divorce was employed in her sixth year as a
counselor at Ogden High School (T. 5 & $).

Husband is a

sales representative for Kraft Foods. fle has been so
employed for 24 years (T. 7 ) . The parties are the parents of
three children, a daughter 10, a son 7, and a daughter 2
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(T. 7 ) . Each of the parties sought custody of the children
in these proceedings/ and Husband is not appealing the trial
court's award of custody to Wife entered pursuant to a
three-day trial.

Husband's taxable income is $2/167 per

month (R.46) and Wife's taxable income is $2/797 per month
(R. 4 2 ) . Wife did not seek alimony (T. 43)/ and was awarded
child support of $139 per month for each of the three
children (R. 85).

Each was ordered to pay his or her own

attorney's fees and court costs.
The assets of the marriage consist of the
following:
(a)

A home in Huntsville/ Utah.

This home was

appraised/ pursuant to an agreement between the parties
and their attorneys/ by Allan C. Heiskanen/ a certified
appraiser/ and by agreement each of the parties paid
one-half of the appraisal fee (T. 8 & 9 ) . The amount of
said appraisal was $95/600 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) and
the mortgage on said home was $9/508 (T. 10)/ leaving a
net equity pursuant to said appraisal of $86/092.
Shortly thereafter Husband had the home appraised by
another certified appraiser/ Lester Froerer/ whose
appraisal was $107/000 (T. 233 & 287).

Said appraisal

was offered into evidence by Husband and admitted
(T. 233 & Defendant's Exhibit 7 ) . The net amount of
said appraisal after deduction of the mortgage is
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$97/492.

Husband testified there Was a third appraisal

for $95/000 (T. 287) leaving a net equity of $85,492
after deduction of the mortgage.

husband testified/

notwithstanding the three appraisals/ he would pay
$120/000 for the home (T. 233) although he did not have
the money to do so and would have to cash in his thrift
plan and borrow money to refinance the home (T. 235).
The court placed a value on the equity in said home of
$90/000.
(b)

A 1984 Subaru in which the court determined

there was an equity of $1/693.

This was based upon

Wife's testimony of a value one-half way between the
high and low blue book on said vehicle/ minus the debt
owing thereon (T. 12).
(c)

Household furniture and furnishings/ together

with mower/ snowblower/ and other Equipment which
Husband had appraised at $5/829 (Defendant's Exhibit 2)
and which value was accepted by th$ court.
(d)

Wife's jewelry on which the court placed a

value of $5/100/ which is the same as an appraisal made
by John's Jewelry Company (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 ) .
(e)

Certain coins which were appraised by G&I

Coins for $2/405 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) and found by
the court to have that value.
(f)

Husband's ring/ which he valued at $300
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(Defendant's Exhibit 1 ) .
(g)

A collection of guns which the court

determined to have a value of $7,035, which is the value
Husband placed thereon in his pre-trial affidavit
(R. 47) and in his answers to interrogatories (T. 18).
(h)

Retirement benefits accrued by Wife through

the Utah Retirement Systems, having a value of
$12,197.44 (T. 20 & Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 ) .
(i)

A pension plan through Husband's employer,

Kraft, Inc.

As a part of discovery, Wife's counsel

obtained from Kraft, Inc. a summary of Husband's
benefits under the plan (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7 & 8 ) ,
which reflected that if Husband terminated his
employment at the time of the response, he would be
entitled to receive $58,995.66.

(Paragraph 13 of

Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 ) . Husband began participating in
this plan in February, 1963 (T. 23), which was 24 years
prior to the date of the divorce trial.

At the time of

the divorce, he had been married to Wife for almost 17
years.

Wife proposed therefore that 17/24 of $58,995 be

considered a marital asset (T. 23 & 24), which amounted
to $41,788.

The court determined the marital value of

this asset to be $41,000 and Husband did not appeal from
that determination.
(j)

A thrift plan accrued by Husband through his
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employment at Kraft, Inc.

Similar information regarding

this plan was obtained by Wife's cdunsel from Kraft,
Inc. (Plaintiff's Exhibits 6, 7, & 9 ) , and Kraft, Inc.
stated that this is a defined contribution plan and that
if Husband terminated his employment on the date of
their response, he would be entitled to receive
$26,394.08 (Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 9 ) .
This plan was established in 1979 $nd the amount
indicated was all accrued during tlje marriage (T. 24).
Under said plan, Husband had three alternatives, one of
which was known as a guaranteed interest fund and in
which his benefits were invested at the time Kraft
stated their value was $26,394 (T. 295-296).

Shortly

thereafter, Husband transferred $1^/360 thereof from the
guaranteed interest fund to a stocH fund, wherein the
value of the stock would fluctuate up and down (T. 297299).

The most current statement is to the amount in

said account at the date of the trial was set forth in
Husband's Exhibit 5, showing a valine of $23,929.81.

The

court rounded the value of said fu^id to $24,000.00
(Memorandum Decision R. 87) without any reduction for
tax consequences or penalty for ea^ly withdrawal.
Wife was awarded the home, with an equity
determined by the court to be $90,000, Subject to her paying
the mortgage thereon, and subject, also, to a non-interest
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bearing lien in favor of Husband/ to be paid upon a sale of
the home/ upon Wife's remarriage/ or not later than March 2,
1990.

The assets awarded to the parties/ together with the

values placed thereon by the trial court/ are as follows:
TO WIFE:
Home
Car
Furni ture
Jewelry
Coins
Mower and snowblower
Her retirement
Sub-total
Less lien on home
TOTAL

$90,000.00
1,693.00
4,340.00
5,100.00
2/405.00
800.00
12/197.00
116,535.00
-22,000.00
$94,535.00

TO HUSBAND:
Furniture
Ring
Firearms
Kraft Pension Plan
Kraft Thrift Plan
Sub-total
Plus lien on home
TOTAL

$

105.00
300.00
7,035.00
41,000.00
24,000.00
72,000.00
+22,000.00
$94,440.00

Wife has been required to retain the services of
legal counsel to represent her in this appeal and has
incurred attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In valuing the family home, the trial court relied
upon three expert appraisals, one made by an appraiser chosen
and paid for by both parties, a second by an appraiser chosen
and paid for by Husband, and a third being an appraisal
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testified to by Husband,

The value of $90/000 chosen by the

trial court was an average of the three appraisals.
Husband's offer to purchase the home lot

$120/000 was made by

him knowing that in all likelihood the home would be awarded
to Wife/ and was an attempt on his part to over-inflate the
value of said home in order to increase the equity he claimed
therein.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial

court to accept the average of the appraisals and to find
that Husband's offer to purchase the hoijne for $120/000 was "a
meaningless bunch of nonsense".
The value of $24/000 set by the trial court for the
Kraft thrift plan was based upon Husband's own testimony and
a summary of the balance in his account provided to him by
Kraft/ Inc. and inroduced by him as his Exhibit 5,

setting

forth the value thereof at $23/929.81 (which the Court
rounded to $24,000).

The determination of the value of said

plan and its award to Husband did not constitute a "taxable
event" under Utah law; warranting the court's taking into
consideration possible future tax consequences and penalties
for early withdrawal.

Husband's claim that he would need to

make an early withdrawal to pay Wife he^r equity in the home
no longer had substance when the trial court awarded the home
to Wife and ordered her to pay Husband'$ equity.

Husband

gave no other valid reason for making ah early withdrawal/
and did not need the proceeds of said fiind to satisfy any
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other order of the court.

The trial court did not commit

error in refusing to take into consideration tax consequences
and penalties for early withdrawal.
The court made findings of fact regarding the value
of each of the marital assets based upon testimony and
exhibits introduced by the parties/ accepting some valuations
proposed by Wife and some proposed by Husband.

The findings

of value made by the trial court were all supported by the
evidence and did not require a detailed explanation by the
trial court as to the reason he selected each particular
valuation.
Wife is entitled to an award of attorney's fees
herein/ inasmuch as the appeal is frivolous and there is no
substance to Husband's argument/ and he is attempting to take
unconscionable advantage of Wife in this appeal.

The case

should be remanded to the trial court for a determination of
Wife's attorney's fees.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
THE VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL
PROPERTY BY REFUSING TO ESTABLISH THE VALUE OF
THE MARITAL RESIDENCE ON THE BASIS OF AN OFFER
TO PURCHASE MADE BY THE APPELLANT-HUSBAND
The Utah Supreme Court/ in the case of Burnham v.
Burnham/ 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986), stated:
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"The trial court in a divorce action is
permitted considerable discre tion in adjusting
the financial and property in terests of the
parties, and its actions are Entitled to a
presumption of validity. ArgVle v. Argyle,
Utah, 688 P.2d 468 (citationsr omitted)."
The burden is therefore on Hu&band to overcome that
presumption, which he has failed to do.

Husband's only

argument is that the court failed to accept his proposed
valuations with respect to the marital residence and the
Kraft thrift plan.

This Court stated, in the case of Ebbert

v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987), that:
"'Determining and assigning values to
marital property is a matter for the trial
court, and this Court will no^ disturb those
determinations absent a showihg of clear abuse
of discretion.1
Talley v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83,
84 (Utah App. 1987). Plaintiff's main argument
is the court failed to accept any of his
proposed valuations. Such action does not
constitute an abuse of discretion."
With respect to the valuation of the home, Husband
in his brief has led this Court to believe that the only
evidence which the trial court had before it regarding the
value of the family home was his own offer to purchase the
home for $120,000, and the Wife's expert appraisal of $95,600
(Appellant's Brief, page 10). He failed to point out that he
also obtained an expert appraisal for $1107,000 and at his
request, it was admitted into evidence (T. 233, 287 &
Defendant's Exhibit 7 ) . He also testified that there had
been yet another appraisal for $95,000 (T. 287). With
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respect to the $95/600 appraisal/ he ; through his attorney/
stipulated to the obtaining of that appraisal and paid onehalf of the appraisal fee (T. 8 & 9 ) ,
The average of the three expert appraisals is
$99,200 and after deducting the mortgage of $9,508 therefrom,
there is an average equity of $89/692.

This is almost

identical to the $90/000 of net equity determined by the
trial court.
In the case of Workman v. Workman/ 652 P.2d 931
(Utah 1982)/ the Utah Supreme Court held that there was no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's valuation of real
property based upon a professional appraisal of $119/360/
rather than three offers obtained by husband/ one for $70/000
and the other two for $51/000.

The Court stated/ at page

933:
"We also find no abuse of discretion in
the district court's valuation of the Park City
property at $119/360—the appraised value—
rather than at $70/000. The court is obviously
free to adopt the valuation of a professional
appraiser in preference to the husband's
unsubstantiated allegations of random offers."
It is obvious that in this case/ it was not an
abuse of discretion for the trial court to accept the
valuations of three appraisers in preference to an offer by
Husband.
It is apparent that in the present case the trial
court averaged the three professional appraisals in
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determining the equity in the family hoitte.
abuse of discretion.

This is not an

In the case of Neymeyer v. Newmeyer/

745 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that
where a husband's appraisal of a family home was $122,000 and
a wife's appraisal thereof was $112,000^ it was not error forthe trial court to fix the value of sai$ home at $117,000,
which was the average of the two.

•$

At p£ge 1278, the Court

stated:
"(in adopting proposed values for marital
assets, trial court may average conflicting
values given by experts to arrive at an
equitable solution)."
The case of Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695 (Utah
1985), cited by Husband for the proposition that a party can
state his own opinion as to the value of real property and
such valuation may properly be considered, is distinguishable
from the present case.

In the Berger case, the court

accepted the husband's opinion as to th£ value of two patents
which he testified were valueless.

In affirming the trial

court's admission of such testimony, th^ Utah Supreme Court
pointed out that "His testimony regarding the patents' value
was the only relevant evidence adduced at trial."

In the

present case, the trial court had before it considerable
other relevant evidence, consisting of two expert appraisals
admitted into evidence and a third appraisal testified to by
Husband.
Husband was aware at the time of the trial that
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Wife wanted very much to be awarded the family home (T. 37).
She has resided there for approximately nine years (R. 43)
and at the time of the trial/ Husband had been living
elsewhere for approximately one year (R. 8 & R. 17). The
home had been built by her father and she testified that
there was a lot of love and memories connected with it/ and
that her children were happy and content in that home and
area (T. 38). She was able to afford the monthly payment and
could not rent a comparable place for the amount of her
mortgage payment (T. 3 8 ) . The home is situated within one
and one-half blocks of her parents in the small town of
Huntsville/ Utah (T. 46) and her mother comes to the family
home and tends the children while Wife is at work (T. 46 &
47).

Her father picks the children up in bad weather and

takes them to and from school (T. 47 & 48). Wife contends
that when Husband offered to purchase the home for $120/000/
he realized that in all likelihood the home would be awarded
to her and his offer was made for the purpose of attempting
to inflate the value of the home so that he would ultimately
receive a more substantial lien against it.

When she filed

for divorce/ Husband became extremely spiteful and revengeful
toward her and threatened that if she divorced him/ he would
break her financially and run up court costs so that she
would lose her home and her place at work and in the
community/ indicating that it was his intention to "totally
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ruin me" (T. 62). A witness/ Faye Layt^>n/ testified that
Husband came to her home and/ referring to Wife; stated/ "He
was going to bankrupt her financially/ Ifie would take her
through the courts/ he would have a jury trial/ it would last
a week/ he would make sure he bankrupted her good name/ and
her employment/ and that he would make Certain that she lost
her job/ and that she would lose the home." (T. 195)

His

spiteful attitude toward her is further evidenced by his
threats to take away her children by revealing to townspeople
in their small community and to her children that as a young
woman she gave birth to a child out-of-wedlock which she
placed for adoption (T. 63-67).
Husband proposed that he woul<3 take the home at a
value of $120/000/ knowing that his threat of taking the home
from her would be realized if the court accepted his proposal
and that by making such an offer/ he woqld be setting the
value of the home at an unrealistically high figure if the
court awarded it to Wife.

In Husband's proposal to the court

(Defendant's Exhibit 1/ page 4)/ he suggested that the court
give him the home at an equity of $110,tOO ($120,000 less the
mortgage) and that he then would pay Wi^e $65/646.50 as a
settlement/ knowing that in all likelihood the court would
not take the home away from Wife and th0 children/ and
obviously realizing that he did not hav$ the means to pay
that amount and that in order to get the money/ he would have
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to "hardship that money" out of his thrift plan (T. 235),
thereby paying some $14,000 in penalties and taxes for early
withdrawal, and then would have to borrow the balance to pay
Wife off (T. 235).
It is obvious that Husband did this so that he
could make an alternative proposal that Wife take the home on
the basis of his $120,000 offer to purchase, thereby having
to pay him $45,053.50 for his equity (Defendant's Exhibit 1,
page 4) rather than the $22,000 lien the trial court actually
gave him against the home.

The trial judge saw through

Husband's maneuvering and rightfully found that "His offer of
$120,000 for the house is a meaningless bunch of nonsense."
(Motion to Clarify T. 22).

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
THE VALUATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL
ASSETS BY FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
EARLY WITHDRAWAL PENALTY AND TAX CONSEQUENCES
OF SUCH WITHDRAWAL IN VALUING APPELLANTHUSBAND'S KRAFT THRIFT PLAN
At the time of the divorce, Husband had an
investment in a pension plan at Kraft, Inc. with a value of
$58,995.66 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 ) . The trial court ruled
that $41,000 of this amount was a marital asset and Husband
did not appeal from that determination.
Husband also had an investment in a thrift plan at
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Kraft/ Inc./ which was a defined contribution plan (T. 295)/
all of which was accrued during the marfiage (T. 25). Wife
was informed by Kraft/ Inc. that as of ^ay 31/ 1986 there was
in said account the sum of $26,394.08 (t« 24 & Plaintiff's
Exhibit 9 ) . Husband had admitted into evidence a more recent
statement from Kraft/ Inc. indicating tjiat as of
September 30/ 1986/ the closest date to the trial for which
reports were available/ the value of sajld account was
$23,929.81 (T. 219 & Defendant's Exhibit 5 ) . The trial court
accepted Husband's valuation/ rounding |t to $24#000 (R. 87).
Wife does not object to that valuation.
Husband contends that the tri^l court should have
reduced the $24,000 value to $10,811 to reflect what he
claims to be a 41 per cent deduction for income taxes and a
10 per cent penalty for early withdrawal.
There was conflicting testimony at the trial as to
the future of the thrift plan.

Husband testified that the

parties had set it up for the purpose o£ financing college
educations for their children (T. 261 & T. 300), and that it
would be another seven or eight years before the children
would be using those funds (T. 300). He also testified that
he was almost 59 years of age (T. 235) ind that he planned to
retire in three years at the age of 62 (T. 239) when he could
withdraw the thrift plan without penalty, and could structure
the withdrawal under various payment methods to minimize or
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eliminate taxes (Plaintiff's Exhibit 11/ page 18).

He also

testified that if he were awarded the home and had to pay
Wife for her equity/ he would have to "hardship that money
out" of the thrift plan and then refinance (T. 235).
The trial judge awarded the home to Wife and
ordered that she pay a $22/000 lien to Husband within three
years/ thereby removing the reason Husband stated he would
need to make the early withdrawal.

The court recognized that

for Husband to voluntarily make such an early withdrawal
would be economically disastrous when the alternative was to
wait a short while until his retirement when the money could
be taken out without penalty and the tax consequences could
be structured.

Defendant gave no other reasons that would

necessitate his withdrawing said fund.

He was earning a

substantial income ($26/000 per year)/ he testified of no
debts/ had no alimony obligation to Wife/ and was required to
pay relatively modest child support of $139 per month for
each of the three children.

He had no lump sum obligation of

any kind to Wife arising out of the divorce.

The trial court

acted within its proper discretion in refusing to discount
the thrift plan for penalty and tax consequences of early
withdrawal.

Under the circumstances/ the court was

completely justified in concluding that if Husband had/ in
fact/ withdrawn the thrift plan after the divorce trial/ he
had done it out of spite (Motion to Clarify T. 16 & 17).
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The law in Utah on this subject is set forth in the
case of Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2ft 221 (Utah 1987),
wherein the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to reduce the present value of & husband's profit
sharing plan to account for income tax liability that could
be imposed in the future.

The Court stated, at page 224:

"We also decline to disturb the trial
court's valuation of the profit-sharing plan.
The trial court did not reduc4 the present
value of the plan to account for income tax
liability that could be imposed in the future.
Plaintiff has not argued and it does not appear
that the valuation of the profit-sharing plan
was itself a taxable event; therefore, we do
not think the trial court's refusal to
speculate about hypothetical future
consequences was an abuse of discretion. See
Gilbert v. Gilbert, 628 P.2d 1088, 1089 (Mont.
1981) Taffirming a property division in which
the trial judge did not adjust the market value
of a retirement account in anticipation of
future tax liability)." (emphasis added)
The main thrust of the case ot Gilbert v. Gilbert,
628 P.2d 1088 (Mont. 1981), cited in th0 Alexander case, is
also that "the property distribution ordered by the District
Court includes no presently taxable events and triggers no
tax liability."

(Page 1089) (emphasis ^dded)

The taxable event concept appears to be the general
rule in this country and is followed by Jnany other cases.
See Weaver v. Weaver, 324 S.E.2d 915 (N.C.App. 1985) wherein
the Court stated, at page 920:
"The trial court is not required to
consider possible taxes when determining the
value of property in the absence of proof that
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a taxable event has occurred during the
marriage or will occur with the division of the
marital property. In re Marriage of Fonstein/
17 Cal.3d 738, 131 Cal.Rptr. 873, 552 P.2d 1169
(1976); accord Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331
A.2d 257 (1975)."
(emphasis added)
It is important to note that in the present case,
there was no "taxable event" ordered by the court and
accordingly, the trial court was correct in refusing to
consider penalties and tax consequences for early withdrawal.
Other factors considered by the courts on this
issue are:

(1) did the court decree require by its terms the

liquidation of the retirement plan?

(2) was it necessary to

liquidate the retirement plan in order to have means to
comply with other provisions of the divorce decree?
See the case of Qazi v. Qazi, 492 N.E.2d 692
(Indiana App.3 Dist. 1986), wherein it was held that if
liquidation of a husband's pension plan was not ordered by
the trial court, any possible tax consequences associated
with liquidation were not to be considered.

See also In Re

Marriage of Hayne, 334 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa App. 1983), wherein
the Court stated:
"Although liquidation of respondent's Keogh
plan would have entailed certain tax
liabilities, the court did not order him to
liquidate his plan, and it is evident that
respondent had other assets available to meet
the court's orders without liquidating it. It
was no error for the court to consider the full
value of the Keogh plan without figuring in the
potential tax liability upon liquidation when
determining the value of marital property for
division under the terms of the decree."
(emphasis added)
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In the present case/ no liquidation was ordered by
the court and Husband had ample assets and financial means to
comply with the decree of the court without liquidating his
thrift plan.
Of the eight cases cited by Hpsband in his brief
dealing with the tax consequences of retirement benefits/
four of said cases refused to consider the tax consequences
and held that the retirement benefits should be valued
without taking into consideration tax consequences.

See

Johnson v. Johnson/ 638 P.2d 705, 131 Aifiz. 38 (1981); In Re
Marriage of Bayer, 687 P.2d 537 (Col.App. 1984); In Re
Marriage of Rowe, 744 P.2d 717 (Ariz.App. 1987); and
Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221 (Utah 1987).
remaining cited cases did not address the issue.

Two of the
See In Re

Marriage of DiPasquale, 716 P.2d 223 (M0nt. 1986), and
Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988).

Although the

case of Dice v. Dice, 742 P.2d 205 (Wyo.| 1987) cited by
Husband holds that the income tax consequences of withdrawing
money from a corporation and profit shading account should be
taken into consideration, that case is rfeadily
distinguishable from the present case.

In Dice, the trial

court ordered a division of assets which necessitated the
immediate liquidation of the profit shading account in order
to provide a lump sum distribution to wijfe.

The Wyoming

Supreme Court ruled only that under the circumstances of that
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case should the tax consequences of such a liquidation be
taken into consideration.

At page 208/ the Court stated:

"We only determine that withdrawal after cash
value should be reflected in divorce-decree
division if an immediate cash payment is
required.n
Again/ in the present case,

no such "immediate cash

payment" was required of Husband by the Court.

POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT MADE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF
FACT TO SUPPORT ITS DISTRIBUTION OF MARITAL
ASSETS
In this case/ the trial court made five pages of
findings of fact on the issues of child custody/ visitation/
and distribution of property (addendum Exhibit D ) •

The court

placed a specific equity value on each of the assets as
follows:
(a)

1984 Subaru - $1,693, based on Wife's

testimony of a value one-half way between high and
low blue book (T. 12).
(b)

Household furniture, furnishings,

lawnmower, snowblower, and other equipment - $5/829/
based on Husband's expert appraisal

(Defendant's

Exhibit 2 ) .
(c)

Wife's jewelry - $5,100/ based upon Wife's

expert appraisal (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 ) .
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(d)

Coins - $2/405/ based upOn Wife's expert

appraisal (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4 ) .
(e)

Husband's ring - $300/ b£sed upon

Husband's valuation (Defendant's Exhibit 1 ) .
(f)

Gun collection - $7/035/ based on

Husband's testimony and answers to interrogatories
(R. 47 & T. 18).
(g)

Wife's retirement - $12/3[97.44/ based on

membership statement from Utah Retirement Systems
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 ) .
(h)

Kraft/ Inc. pension plan - $41/000/ based

on statement from Kraft/ Inc. (Paragraph 13 of
Plaintiff's Exhibit 8 and discounted by the court to
reflect 17 years of marriage as compared to 24 years
of accrual) (T. 23 & 24).
None of the above valuations v^ere appealed by
Husband.
The only valuations disputed by Husband are the
family home and the Kraft thrift plan.

The statement made by

Husband on page 20 of his brief that "We know that the court
adopted the value sponsored by Mrs. Ellison for both the home
and the thrift plan/ but we do not know why." is clearly
erroneous.

Wife proposed that the value of the home should

be based upon her expert appraisal/ less the mortgage/ which
totaled $86,092 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12/ line 1 ) . The court
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determined the equity in said home to be $90,000.

This is

the average of Wife's expert appraisal (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 2), Defendant's expert appraisal (Defendant's
Exhibit 7 ) , and the third appraisal testified to by Husband
(T. 287).
Regarding the thrift plan, the statement made by
Husband on page 20 of his brief that "The valuation of the
thrift plan is void of any indication of how the court
reached the decision to adopt the $24,000 figure." is also
erroneous.

Wife proposed that the thrift plan be valued at

$26,394 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12, paragraph 13), but the court
accepted Husband's valuation of $23,929.81 (rounding it to
$24,000) (Defendant's Exhibit 5 ) , and then refused to
discount said amount for tax consequences and early
withdrawal penalties.

The law does not require that the

court go through a lengthy explanation as to how he arrived
at the value of each particular asset so long as there is
sufficient evidence to support the finding.

See In Re

Marriage of Sessions, 753 P.2d 1306 (Mont. 1988) wherein the
Court stated:
"When conflicting expert testimony is given,
the trier of fact has full discretion to give
weight to the testimony as he sees fit.
(citations omitted) The court chose to rely on
wife's expert and substantial evidence supports
the court's finding here."
In the case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah
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1985)/ the Utah Supreme Court ruled thatt the trial court
failed to make adequate findings where it simply stated that
the distribution was "fair and equitable" without placing
specific values on the assets.

The Couift pointed out that

"Neither the memorandum decision nor th^ findings assigned
individual values to each of the assets or a total value to
the cumulative share being awarded to each party."
(Page 1073) and went on to point out that "Normally/ we would
grant the remedy sought by the wife and remand for findings
on the specific values of the assets."

(Page 1074)

The

present case clearly meets the criteria set forth in Jones/
in that the trial judge assigned individual values to each of
the assets and also/ a total value to the cumulative share
being awarded to each party.
In the case of Pearson v. Pearson/ 561 P.2d 1080
(Utah 1977)/ the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"In regard to the matter of the
sufficiency of findings of faqt/ a substantial
compliance with Rule 52/ Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure/ is sufficient/ and findings of fact
and conclusions of law will support a judgment/
though they are very general/ jwhere they in
most respects follow the alleg ation of the
pleadings. Findings should bel limited to the
ultimate facts and if they asc|lertain ultimate
facts/ and sufficiently conforkn to the
pleadings and the evidence to support the
judgment^ they will be regarded as sufficient/
though not as full and as complete as might be
desired." (emphasis added)
The findings made by the court in the present case
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"ascertain ultimate facts/ and sufficiently conform to the
pleadings and the evidence to support the judgment".
Clearly/ the findings are sufficient.
In the case of Hurley v. Hurley/ 721 P.2d 1279
(Mont. 1986) cited by Husband for the proposition that when
faced with widely conflicting valuations the court must give
reasons for the selection of one value over another/ the
Court goes on to hold that where the evidence shows that the
wife's method of valuation was more sound than the method
suggested by husband, any error in the court's failure to
give reasons for the selection of one value over another is
harmless.

In the present case, even if the Appellate Court

should hold that more detailed reasons should have been given
by the trial court for its valuation/ such error would/ in
fact/ be harmless where the method followed by the court is
more sound than the method suggested by husband.
In setting forth U.R.C.P. 52(a)/ on page 4 of his
brief/ it is interesting that Husband deleted therefrom the
sentence which reads:

"Findings of fact/ whether based on

oral or documentary evidence/ shall not be set aside unless
clearly erroneous/ and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of
the witnesses."

As it relates to this case/ this is the most

significant sentence in the rule.

Husband has failed to

establish that the findings of fact are "clearly erroneous"/
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and the Court of Appeals should affirm the decision of the
trial court.

POINT IV
APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS/ JUSTIFYING THE
AWARD TO RESPONDENT OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COURT COSTS RELATED TO THIS APPEAL
Rule 33/ Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals
provides as follows:
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous
appeal. If the court determines that a motion
made or an appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay/ it shall award
just damages and single or dou|ble costs/
including reasonable attorney fees,
to the
prevailing party." (addendum Exhibit B)
In the case of Eames v. Eames ; 735 P.2d 395 (Utah
appeal from the
App. 1987), this Court held that a husband's
husba
divorce court's property division and al imony award was
frivolous and awarded the wife attorney' s fees on appeal/
pursuant to Rule 33(a) cited above. Wit h respect to the
property division aspect of said appeal/ this Court stated/
at page 397:
"An appellant has the burden of showing
that the trial court's award 'korks such a
manifest injustice or inequity as to clearly be
an abuse of that broad discretlion [in adjusting
the financial needs and proper |ty interests of
the parties].'"
The Court went on to state:
"The Court recognizes the right of a party
to argue in an attempt to corre ct what that
party deems to be error in the court below.
However/ when there is no basics for the
argument presented and when th evidence or law
is mischaracterized and missta ed, the Court
must question the party's moti es. The record
shows the trial judge making F[i ndings of Fact/
dividing the property/ and awa ding support
after a careful consideration f all the
evidence. Defendant ignores t is."
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In the present case, the trial judge made findings
of fact/ assigning values to each asset and dividing the
property after a careful consideration of all of the
evidence.

Husband in this case misstated the evidence on

page 20 of his brief when he said that "The valuation of the
thrift plan is void of any indication of how the court
reached the decision to adopt the $24,000 figure."

This was

the testimony of Husband himself and was based upon his own
exhibit, as previously set forth.

The evidence is further

mischaracterized when, on page 20 of his brief, Husband
stated, "We know the court adopted the value sponsored by
Mrs. Ellison for both the home and the thrift plan, but we do
not know why."

The court did not adopt the value sponsored

by Mrs. Ellison for either the home or the thrift plan.

With

respect to the home, her appraisal reflected an equity of
$86,092, as compared to a $90,000 finding by the court, and
she introduced evidence of a value in the thrift plan of
$26,394, as compared to the $24,000 testified to by husband
and accepted by the court.
Husband also misstated the law when, on page 4 of
his brief, he deleted from U.R.C.P. 52(a) the sentence which
reads:

"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or

documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses."

-

?fi -

Wife is entitled to attorney1$ fees and costs
incurred in this appeal and the case shpuld be remanded to
the trial court for a determination of said attorney's fees
and costs.

CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial coutft should be affirmed
and respondent should be awarded her attorney's fees and
court costs incurred in connection with this appeal/ with the
amount thereof to be determined by the tirial court on remand.

Respectfully submitted, this
23rd dajy of Septeniber, 1988.

C. Gerald Parker
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 23rd day of
September/ 1988, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing Respondent's Brief/ by placing the same
in the United States Mail/ postage prepaid/ and addressed to
appellant's attorney/ L. Zane Gill/ at 5250 South 300 West/
Suite 55, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107.

C. Gerald Parker
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A:

Rule 52, Utah Rules of Cilvil Procedure

EXHIBIT B:

Rule 33, Rules of the Uta|h Court of Appeals

EXHIBIT C:

Memorandum Decision

EXHIBIT D:

Findings of Fact and Concjlusions of Law

EXHIBIT E:

Judgment and Decree of Divorce
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UTAH RULES OP CfV^ PROCEDURE

Rule 52. Findings by the court
(a) Effect, In all actions tried upon the facta without a jury or with an
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately ita
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi*
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of ita action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposea of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and clue regard shall be given
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow*
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court, The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for ita
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 66, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 daya after
entry of judgment the court may amend ita findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend {them, a motion forjudge
ment, or a motion for a new trial.

EXHIBIT A

RULES OF THE UTAH 0OURT OF APPEALS

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney fees,
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. If the court determines that
a motion made or an appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous or for
delay, it shall award just damages and single or double costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party.
(b) Disciplinary action for inadequate representation. The court may
impose appropriate sanctions against any counsel who inadequately represents a client on appeal.

EXHIBIT B

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON,
Plaintiff,

i

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON,
)

Case No.

94781

Defendant.

In the hearing of this matter, % gave a bench ruling on
all matters other than a division of th^ assets, and they shall
be as follows:
Plaintiff is awarded the home, with an equity value of
$90,000; the 1984 Subaru, value $1,693; household furniture and
fixtures, valued at $4,340; her jewelry, $5,100; silver and gold
coins

in her possession, $2,405; lawn mower

$800;

her

Utah

State

retirement,

and

$l2J,197; for

snow blower,
a

total

of

$116,535.
Defendant is awarded household furniture and fixtures in
his possession, $105; his diamond ring, $$00; the Noble Affiliate
Stock is not apparently a marital asset.

He is awarded the gun

collection, $7,035; his bank account apparently was non-existent,
as he had to borrow money when he move<3.

I value his Kraft

Pension Plan at $41,000; the Thrift Plan et $24,000, for a total
of

$72,440.

In order

to equalize

the assets, the husband

FYMIRIT P.
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defendant is to have a lien against the Huntsville home in the
sum of $22/000,

The lien shall be non-interest bearing and shall

be payable if the wife sells the home or remarries.

As to having

it due when the youngest child reaches majority, this is far too
long a period of time.

The home can easily be refinanced, and it

would be recommended that it be done while interest

rates are

low.

shall not

At any

rate, the time period for re-payment

exceed three years from date.
DATED this j£_

day of March, 1987.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision to C. Gerald Parker,
Attorney for Plaintiff, 2610 Washington Boulevard, Ogden, Utah
84401, and to Pete N. Vlahos, Attorney for Defendant, 2447 Kiesel
Avenue, Ogden, Utah 84401, on this ^
day of March, 1987.

TtailZ
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C. Gerald Parker, #2520
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2610 Washington Blvd.
P. O. Box 107
Ogden, Utah 84402
Telephone: 399-3303

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF ^fEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

0
K

SUZANNE LYNN ELLISON,

<
>

Plaintiff,

o h5
(D 0 CD

vs.

zji

g 22
0 • D

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civ^l No. 94781

ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON,
Defendant.

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial
conunencing the 23rd day of February, 198[7, and continuing through
February 24 and February 25, before the honorable Ronald O. Hyde,
one of the Judges of the above-entitled £ourt sitting without a
jury; the plaintiff appeared in person ajid was represented by her
counsel, C. Gerald Parker, and the defendant appeared in person
and was represented by his counsel, Pete N. Vlahos. The Court
heard evidence introduced on behalf of bpth of the parties,
including testimony from several witnesses on behalf of each

party, and after being fully advised in the premises, the Court
made a partial ruling and then took the remaining issues under
advisement.

The Court thereafter issued its Memorandum Decision

regarding the remaining issues, pursuant to which plaintiff's
attorney prepared a draft of proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce, to which defendant
filed Objections.

A hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Clarify

Findings of Fact and on defendant's Objections, together with a
hearing on defendant's Motion for Court to Re-Evaluate Assets was

o

heard on June 5, 1987, pursuant to which the Court clarified the

°8 J
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findings of fact and refused to re-evaluate assets.

The Court

now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
K

0

Id £
*

K

2

N

1.

That plaintiff is a bona fide and actual resident of

Weber County, Utah, and has been for more than three months
immediately prior to the commencement of this action.
2.

That plaintiff and defendant were married to each

other at Eden, Utah, on June 18, 1970, and ever since said time
have been and now are husband and wife.
3.

That the parties are the parents of three minor

children, to-wit:

LINDA LEE ELLISON, age 10 years, born June 4,

1976; DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, age 7 years, born October 8, 1979;
and ELIZABETH KATHRYN ELLISON, age 2 years, born April 2, 1984.
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Plaintiff has by far better parenting ^kills than does defendant,
and the best interests of the children kill be served by their
custody being awarded to plaintiff.

Plaintiff's parenting skills

are superior to those of defendant in h£r abilities as a
homemaker and the fact that the children are cared for in their
own home by their maternal grandmother while plaintiff is at
work, as opposed to defendant's proposal that the children would
be cared for in daycare centers were th^y in his custody.
o
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Plaintiff also has better skills in insuring that the children
are well-fed, clothed, groomed, and educated.

She has better

skills in disciplining the children by Sending them to their room
or withholding television. Plaintiff is more sensitive to the
emotional needs of the children, as evi4enced by her encouraging
a loving relationship between them and t^ieir father, as opposed
to his attempts to turn the children frqm her by telling them
that she had given a baby away.

Plaintiff's educational and

employment experience have enhanced her parenting skills, in that
she has a Bachelor's Degree in Elementary Education, a Master's
Degree in Special Education with emphasis on the behaviorily
handicapped, the intellectually handicapped, and those who have
learning disabilities.

She also has an additional 70 hours of

postgraduate education in counseling and she has had
approximately five years experience as a professional counselor
at Ogden High School.
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The Court interviewed each of the children at length
individually and is satisfied that based upon their feelings and
desires, and the findings made above, that their best interest
will be served by their custody being awarded to plaintiff.
4.

Regarding visitation rights, the Court finds that

serious problems exist with regard to defendant visiting the
children and that such difficulties are not likely to improve,
but the Court finds that defendant should continue to have the
5
o

right to take the children at the following times:
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(a)
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p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m.

SB |dz
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Every other weekend from Friday at 6

(b)

On alternate holidays, provided that

plaintiff shall always have the children on

I 8

Mother's Day and defendant shall always have

LU

2

them on Father's Day.
(c)

For two weeks at the beginning of each

summer and for two weeks near the end of each
summer•
(d)

On Christmas afternoon from 1 p.m.

until a reasonable hour that evening.
5.

That during the course of the marriage, defendant

has treated plaintiff cruelly, causing great mental distress.
His cruel treatment has included embarrassing and demeaning
plaintiff
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in public; continually threatening throughout the marriage to
tell neighbors and friends that plaintiff had given birth to a
child out of wedlock which she had placted for adoption,
notwithstanding the fact that he was aw^re of such incident at
the time he married plaintiff; and by spbsequently relating said
incident to members of the community; ai|id by causing constant
turmoil and anxiety and fear within the family unit.
6.
0
K

<
>

3 °

That the parties have acquired assets, including the

following:
(a) A home at 333 South ^300 East,

0 ^ t

a oo

°8i

Huntsville, Utah, with an equity value of

0 • 3

$90,000.00.

i*s

names of ROBERT EUGENE ELLISO^ and SUZANNE WOOD

5 8

Said property nov^ stands in the

ELLISON, and the legal description thereof is
as follows:
Part of Lot 2, Block 1, Plat Cu Huntsville
Survey, Weber County, Utah: Beginning at the
Northeast corner of said Lot 2) thence South
271.6 feet; thence North 8D42' West 117.75
feet; thence North 41D53' West 22.0 feet;
thence North 14 rods; thence E&st 8 rods to
beginning.
(b)

A 1984 Subaru valued 4t $1,693.00.

(c)

Household furniture aftd furnishings in

plaintiff's possession valued stt $4,340.00.
(d)

Plaintiff's jewelry valued at

$5,100.00.
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(e)

Silver and gold coins in plaintiff's

possession, worth $2,405.00,
(f)

Lawnmower and snowblower worth

$800.00.

(g) Utah State Retirement benefits accrued
by plaintiff in the sum of $12,197.00.
(h) Household furniture and fixtures in
defendant's possession worth $105.00.
5
o

(i)

xg

Defendant's diamond ring worth

$300.00.

o 2 §

(j)

<Cffl0 CD
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A gun collection worth $7,035.00.

(k) A pension plan known as the Kraft

7 0 • ^
i | otuz

Pension Plan, the value of which was accrued by

SI S
o: 2

defendant during this marriage in the sum of
$41,000.00.
(1) A retirement plan accrued by defendant
during this marriage known as the Kraft Thrift
Plan worth $24,000.00.
(m)
7.

Personal effects of each party.

That plaintiff is employed as a counselor at Ogden

High School with a net income of approximately $1,885.00 per
month.

Defendant is employed as a sales representative at Kraft,

Inc., with a taxable income of approximately $2,167.00 per month.

- 6

8.

That defendant has medical and dental insurance

available for the children through his employment.
9.

That the parties have outstanding financial

indebtedness.
10.

That each party has retailed legal counsel to

represent them in these proceedings and each has incurred
attorney's fees and court costs herein.

n

From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court arrives
as the following:
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1.

That plaintiff is entitled to a Decree of Divorce

from the defendant, the same to become f|inal on the date the
divorce decree is signed by the Court an^l entered by the Clerk in
the Register of Actions.
2.

That plaintiff be awarded t](ie care, custody and

control of the three minor children of tlfie parties, to-wit:
LINDA LEE ELLISON, DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, and ELIZABETH KATHRYN
ELLISON.

Defendant shall be granted the right to take the

children for visitation at the following times:
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(a)

Every other weekend from Friday at 6

p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m.
(b)

On alternate holidays, provided that

plaintiff shall always have the children on
Mother's Day and defendant shall always have
them on Father's Day.
(c)

For two weeks at the beginning of each

summer and for two weeks near the end of each
o

summer.
(d) On Christmas afternoon from 1 p.m.
0 h *
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until a reasonable hour that evening.
Each party is enjoined and restrained from attempting to
alienate the children from the other party and from making

K 0
UJ i

2

derogatory or demeaning remarks about the other party in the
presence of the children.
3.

That plaintiff be awarded, and defendant be required

to pay to plaintiff, the sum of $139.00 per month for the support
and maintenance of each of the children, for a total of $417.00
per month child support.

Said support shall be paid through the

office of the Clerk of Weber County, Utah in two equal semimonthly installments, with one-half of the total payment to be
made on or before the 5th day of each month and a like amount to

- 8 -

be paid on or before the 20th day of eath month.

Said support

shall be subject to the provisions of Title 78-45d-l, et seq.,
Utah Code Annotated.
4.

That defendant be required to maintain medical and

dental insurance on the children of the parties through his
employment, and each party shall be required to pay one-half of
any such expenses which are not covered by insurance.
5.

That each party be required to pay any debts he or

she has incurred since the separation of the parties.
6.

That plaintiff be awarded tjhe following assets:
(a)

The home at 333 South 7300 East,

Huntsville, Utah, subject to t^ie mortgage
thereon.
(b)

The 1984 Subaru, subject to the debt

thereon.
(c)

All of the household furniture and

fixtures now in her possession.
(d)

Her jewelry, together with the silver

and gold coins in her possession.

7.

(e)

The lawnmower and snowblower.

(f)

Her Utah State retirement.

(g)

Her personal effects.

That defendant be awarded tt^e following assets:

- 9 -

(a) The household furniture and fixtures
now in his possession.
(b) His diamond ring.
(c) The Noble Affiliate stock which is
considered by the Court to be a non-marital
asset.
(d) The gun collection.
(e) All of his retirement benefits accrued

s

1.

through the Kraft Pension Plan, together with
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all of those benefits accrued through the Kraft
g
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Thrift Plan.
8.

That defendant be awarded a lien against the home at

•"

1 ? < oo

333 South 7300 East, Huntsville, Utah, in the amount of

of o

$22,000.00.

2

Said lien shall be non-interest bearing and shall be

payable by plaintiff at such time as she sells the home, or at
such time as she remarries; provided, however, that said lien
shall be payable in any event not later than March 2, 1990.
9.

That each party be required to pay any attorney's

fees and Court costs he or she has incurred herein.
10.

That each party be required to execute any deeds,

conveyances, assignments, certificates of title, or other

- 10 n
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documents necessary to effect the transfers set forth herein.
Let judgment be entered accordingly.
DATED this

rj

Zl

day of Juns^-J.987.

y

Ronald 0[. Hyde
District Judge
Approved as to form and content:
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took the remaining issues under advisement, and thereafter issued
its Memorandum Decision, pursuant to which plaintiff's attorney
prepared a draft of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Decree of Divorce, to which defendant filed Objections.
A hearing on plaintiff's Motion to Clarify Findings of Fact and
on defendant's Objections, together with a hearing on defendant's
Motion for Court to Re-Evaluate Assets, was heard on June 5,
1987, pursuant to which the Court clarified the findings of fact
and refused to re-evaluate assets.

O

Now by virtue of the law and

•C a.

0 <

premises, in accordance with the facts found and conclusions of

h >
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law aforesaid, it is hereby

I
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ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

*
i o
t
L

That plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree of Divorce

o

from defendant, and the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore
existing between the plaintiff and defendant are hereby
dissolved, and the parties are hereby restored to the status of
unmarried persons, with said decree to become final on the date
said decree is signed by the Court and entered by the Clerk in
the Register of Actions.
2.

That plaintiff is hereby awarded the care, custody

and control of the three minor children of the parties, to-wit:
LINDA LEE ELLISON, DAVID ROBERT ELLISON, and ELIZABETH KATHRYN

- 2-
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ELLISON, subject to visitation rights in defendant.

Said

defendant shall have the right to take the children at the
following times:
(a)

Every other weekend frpm Friday at 6

p.m. until Sunday at 6 p.m.
(b)

On alternate holidays, provided that

plaintiff shall always have the children on
Mother's Day and defendant shal|l always have
them on Father's Day.

o
c
<
>

(c)

3 °
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For two weeks at the beginning of each

summer and for two weeks near tihe end of each

X
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3

summer.

<
>
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(d)

l| *d S«
ici

until a reasonable hour that evening.

On Christmas afternoon from 1 p.m.

Each party is enjoined and restrained from attempting to
alienate the children from the other party and from making
derogatory or demeaning remarks about the other party in the
presence of the children.
3.

That plaintiff is hereby awarded, and defendant is

hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff, the Sum of $139.00 per month
for the support and maintenance of each of the children, for a
total of $417.00 per month child support,.

Said support shall be

paid through the office of the Clerk of ptfeber County, Utah in two

3-
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equal semi-monthly installments, with one-half of the total
payment to be made on or before the 5th day of each month and a
like aimount to be paid on or before the 20th day of each month.
Said support shall be subject to the provisions of Title 78-45d1, et seq., Utah Code Annotated.
4.

That defendant is hereby ordered to maintain medical

and dental insurance on the children of the parties through his
employment, and each party is hereby ordered to pay one-half of
o
-J

any such expenses which are not covered by insurance.

o
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5.
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That each party is hereby ordered to pay any debts

he or she has incurred since the separation of the parties.
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6.
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That plaintiff is hereby awarded the following

assets:
(a)

©

The home at 333 South 7300 East#

Huntsville, Utah, subject to the mortgage
thereon.

Said home now stands of record in the

names of ROBERT EUGENE ELLISON and SUZANNE WOOD
ELLISON, and the legal description thereof is
as follows:
Part of Lot 2, Block 1, Plat C, Huntsville
Survey, Weber County, Utah: Beginning at the
Northeast corner of said Lot 2; thence South
271.6 feet; thence North 82D421 West 117.75
feet; thence North 41D53' West 22.0 feet;
thence North 14 rods; thence East 8 rods to
beginning.
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(b)

The 1984 Subaru, subjqct to the debt

thereon.
(c)

All of the household furniture and

fixtures now in her possession.
(d)

Her jewelry, together with the silver

and gold coins in her possession.

7.

(e)

The lawnmower and snoWblower.

(f)

Her Utah State retirement.

(g)

Her personal effects.

That defendant is hereby awarded the following

(a)

The household furniturte and fixtures

now in his possession.
(b)

His diamond ring.

(c)

The Noble Affiliate stock which is

considered by the Court to be 4 non-marital
asset.
(d)

The gun collection.

(e)

All of his retirement benefits accrued

through the Kraft Pension Plan,, together with
all of those benefits accrued through the Kraft
Thrift Plan.
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8.

That defendant is hereby awarded a lien against the

home at 333 South 7300 East, Huntsville, Utah, in the amount of
$22,000,00.

Said lien shall be non-interest bearing and shall be

payable by plaintiff at such time as she sells the home or at
such time as she remarries; provided, however, that said lien
shall be payable in any event not later than March 2, 1990.
9.

That each party is hereby ordered to pay any

attorney's fees and court costs he or she has incurred herein.
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10.
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deeds, conveyances, assignments, certificates of title, or other
documents necessary to effect the transfers set forth herein.
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That each party is hereby ordered to execute any

DATED this

JL ^

day of June, 1987.

o

Ronald O. Hyde
District Judge

2

Vlahoi
Attorney foir Defendant
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